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Abstract
How match-making methods a¤ect marriage outcomes is an understudied topic. Using a survey of
Chinese couples in 1991, this paper examines whether parental involvement in match-making a¤ects a
couples marriage harmony and joint income. We nd that, compared with those married through self
search, couples relying on parental help in match-making have on average less harmony and less income
in rural areas. This nding holds after we use the area-specic tradition of parental match-making as an
instrumental variable (IV) for parental involvement. In comparison, urban areas show a similar negative
e¤ect of parental match-making on marriage harmony, but the e¤ect on income is slightly positive in OLS
and becomes more signicant with the IV. These results are consistent with our theoretical prediction
about the agency cost of using parents as matchmakers in the marriage market.
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1 Introduction
Marriage formation is typically modeled in the literature as a matching process similar as labor market
matching between workers and rms, where males and females meet each other randomly or assisted by
commercial agents.1 This modeling approach, though working quite well in modern western society, has not
addressed a unique feature of marriage matching, i.e., marriage is not a simple matter of two individuals
forming a new family, it also connects the existing families of their parents and perhaps of relatives. Such
externality has been very important in history and is still so in todays developing countries, where parents
play a signicant role in the marriage of children.2
In this paper we argue that parental involvement in match-making may have a distorting e¤ect on
marriage outcomes. This goes beyond the typical principal-agent problem in matching such as that between
a house seller and a real estate agent, because parents that help match-making in the marriage formation
process also have a long-term relationship with the couple after matching is done; such future interactions
may distort incentives in the matching process and thus a¤ect matching quality. For example, parents who
expect to receive nancial support from their son after his marriage may care less about how attractive his
wife is to him but more about how able she is in contributing to family incomes, and as a result, the best wife
candidate in the parentseye can di¤er from what is optimal to the son, even though parents are altruistic
and care dearly about the sons welfare.
This idea is formally analyzed in a simple model where the son chooses whether to search a potential
wife himself or to delegate his parents to conduct the search for him.3 Relying on parental involvement in
match-making has two types of e¤ects on his welfare. The negative e¤ect arises from the agency cost due
to the above-mentioned conict of interests between parents and the son. The positive e¤ect comes from
parentsexpertise, since parents with the help of relatives and friends may get access to a larger pool of
marriageable singles than the son, and they may have better capabilities of evaluating the quality of marriage
candidates. And in many cases, parents often pay the searching cost themselves if they do the search, as
searching involves not only monetary expenditure, but also time and e¤ort as well as social capital that
cannot be easily compensated by the son even if he is willing to. In this sense, parental involvement saves
cost for the son compared with his own search. So the net e¤ect of parental involvement on the sons welfare
is not obvious and may vary across time and areas.
This framework is tested using the data of more than 8000 Chinese couples surveyed in 1991 across 7
provinces. In this dataset, about 58% in the rural area and 19% in the urban area were married by parental
involvement, and the rest by self match. To measure marriage outcomes, we focus on two variables the
degree of domestic harmony and the joint income of husband and wife. The former measures the extent to
which a couple has conicts in their marital life, while the latter measures a couples economic wellbeing.
The comparison across the two groups of match-making shows that couples with parents as matchmakers
have less harmonious marital life and lower income in the rural area, while the pattern in the urban area
is the same in terms of marital harmony but the opposite in joint income. This result is further conrmed
in regressions that feature many control variables and the treatment of the endogeneity problem of parental
involvement.
A challenge in estimating the e¤ect of parental involvement on marriage outcomes is the endogenous choice
1See the survey by Weiss (1997) for the related literature.
2See, for example, Davidson and Ekelund (1997) and Anderson (2003) for the changing marriage formation in European
history and India and Cheung (1972) in pre-modern China.
3The model applies also to women searching for husbands; the mans case is used only to simplify the exposition.
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of match-making means. First, those with lower human capital or higher individual-specic search costs in
are more likely to delegate the search process to their parents (adverse selection). Second, individuals with
more competent parents or whose parents have larger stakes in the marriage outputs are more likely to use
parental involvement (positive selection). Since the factors that determine the choice between parental
involvement and self search also a¤ect life quality after marriage, if some of them are unobservable to
researchers, the estimated e¤ect of parental intervention on marriage outcomes to be biased, the direction of
which can be either way, depending upon whether the adverse selection of individuals or the positive selection
of parents is stronger. For example, if only those who have di¢ culty in nding a partner by themselves rely
on parental help, their average joint couple incomes may be lower even though parental involvement has a
positive e¤ect by itself.
We use an instrumental variable approach to address this issue. The basic idea is as follows. Suppose
parents are more likely to help match-making where the tradition of doing so is stronger. In the theory
section, we show that a tradition of parental match-making reects an advantage of search cost applicable
to every parent independent of individual characteristics. Thus, couples in an area with a strong parental
match-making tradition are more likely to rely on parental help than others even though they are identical
otherwise. We use the percentage of parent-involved matches in the previous cohort in an area to measure
the tradition of parental involvement. After controlling for area characteristics, this measure is unlikely to
have any direct e¤ect on an individual couples marriage outcomes, and thus satises the exclusion criterion
of a valid instrumental variable for the endogenous choice of match-making method.
Overall, we nd that, compared with couples married by self search, the emotional dimension of mar-
riage outcome is lower for those with parental involvement, but their joint incomes may be higher or lower
depending on how parents and children di¤er in preferences and search costs. The di¤erent e¤ects on the
emotional and monetary dimensions of marriage outcomes are consistent with the notion that love between
husband and wife is consumed privately within the couple, thus it generates much less positive externality
on others than their incomes, which can be shared or transferred among members in the extended family.
This paper contributes to the marriage literature by generating new insights on how match-making meth-
ods may a¤ect marriage outcomes. Unlike the classical focus on the e¤ects of sex ratio (Angrist 2002), divorce
law (Chiappori 2002), or educational composition on marriage outcomes, we highlight the institutional de-
tails of how the match is accomplished in the rst place. In particular, our theory suggests that parental
involvement in match-making may distort the optimal spouse choice in that they tend to emphasize more
on the potential spouses earning abilities than the match quality or attraction between the couple.
In a related paper, Edlund and Lagerlof (2006) use a simple model to show that the shift from parental
to individual consent in marriage allows the son instead of his parents to receive the bride price and thus
facilitates economic growth. In comparison, our focus is not on who controls the resources in marriage,
but on the agency cost of relying parents as matchmakers, and the two match-making methods in our
paper are both under the individual consent. The trade-o¤ between love and money is also explored by
Fernandez et al. (2005) but from a di¤erent perspective of marriage sorting on skills and its relationship
with income inequality; they do not discuss di¤erent match-making methods at all, though it seems likely
that the prevalence of parental involvement should be positively associated with income inequality.
The roles of dowries and bride prices in the traditional marriage formation process have been examined
extensively in the literature4 . Such nancial transfers between families of bride and groom, though not
explicitly analyzed in this paper, are implicitly embedded in the searching cost of our model. When they are
4See, for example, Becker (1973, 1981), Zhang and Chan (1999), Botticini and Siow (2003), Suen et al. (2003) and Anderson
(2007).
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large and therefore have to be paid by parents due to credit constraints faced by young people, parents are
more likely to take charge of the match-making process even when its e¤ects are negative on the marriage
outcomes, which seems to be indeed the case in the rural area in our data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes a simple theoretical model on the choice
of match-making methods and develops key empirical implications. Section 3 describes the data and presents
some preliminary evidence consistent with the model. The main empirical results are shown in Section 4,
and some conclusive remarks are o¤ered in Section 5.
2 A Theoretical Model: E¤ects of Search Methods on Marriage
Outcomes
To guide the empirical exercise, we construct a simple theoretical model on the choice of marriage searching
methods. The model focuses on the marital decision of a young man, who has nished schooling and started
working to earn a living. The search process for a potential wife can either be managed directly by the
young mans parents or by himself, and the process that yields a higher net expected utility to him will
be implemented. This set up is meant to capture the current practice in China, where marriage cannot be
forced upon by parents, and males are usually the one who initiates and proposes a deal for marriage. It is
useful to note that the same model can be used to study the search process of a young woman, and it can
also be readily extended to the case where parents arrange the marriage without consent of children.
Marriage Output. An individuals benet from marriage can be categorized into two dimensions; one
is the economic gain from joint household production, and the other is the emotional support. The total
benet is a¤ected not only by the human capital of husband and wife, but also by their matching quality.
Let hm  0 denote the young mans human capital level, which presumably a¤ects his earning and also
his intra-household productivity, and thus may include, for example, his innate ability, character, years of
schooling, communication skills, etc. Similarly, let hf  0 denote his potential wifes human capital level.
hm and hf jointly determine the total household production f(hf ; hm), which reects both the couples joint
income earned from markets and home production. We assume f(0; 0) > 0, fi > 0, fij > 0, and fii  0 for
i; j 2 f1; 2g.
Another important element in marriage is the match quality, denoted by , which is idiosyncratic to the
specic couple and is thus not readily observed by others; it can be interpreted as love or attraction between
two persons, which is often unpredictable based on commonly observed characteristics; this implies that 
can be treated as uncorrelated with hf . Given our assumption that marriage is always implemented with
mutual consent by the young couple, it implies that the emotional output of marriage is positive and thus
 > 0 is assumed.5
For a young man with hm, the overall gain from marrying a wife with hf and  is ( + )f(hf ; hm),
where  > 0. One may think of the parameter  as capturing the husbands share of material gain from the
marriage, while  captures the degree of emotional benet. The parentsgain from their son being married
to a wife with characteristics (; hf ) also contains two parts: one is the public good component f(hf ; hm)
received by them, and the other is the altruistic component ( + )f(hf ; hm) because they care about
the welfare of their son, where  > 0 and  2 (0; 1). Note that the love  between the husband and wife
is by denition consumed privately by the couple themselves, and is thus not a¤ecting the parentswelfare
directly. The wifes characteristics that may a¤ect the whole family, such as pleasant personality and beauty,
5This assumption is for simplicity only, as the same results can be derived for the case with   0.
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are already indicated by the wifes human capital hf , which as mentioned earlier is broadly dened and not
restricted to formal schooling.
Searching Costs. Marital search is costly. If the son conducts the search himself, he has to bear the
search cost, which is mc(; hf ; hm) > 0, where m; c1; c2 > 0 and c3; c31; c32 < 0. This means that it is
more costly for a man with a given hm to nd and persuade a better quality woman (with higher  or
hf ) to become his wife, and the search cost for a given quality of wife is lower if the mans hm is higher.
The parameter m indicates the e¤ect of some common elements on the cost of searching by oneself for all
individuals in a marriage market and is thus not dependent on idiosyncratic conditions.
If the parents are dealing with the search process, they will bear the search cost, which presumably
depends on how intelligent they are in assessing  and how well they are connected with relevant social
networks that have access to potential candidates. The parents degree of competence in this matter is
denoted by hp  0, and the parental search cost is ps(; hf ; hp) > 0, where p; s1; s2 > 0 and s3; s31; s32 < 0.
Similar as m, the parameter p also denotes some common factor that a¤ects the cost of searching by all
parents. To capture the idea that the match quality  is couple idiosyncratic, we assume that, in order to
achieve the same level of , the parentssearch cost cannot be too low compared with the direct search by
their son, i.e., ps1  mc1 for any given hm, hf , and hp.
The Optimal Choice of Search Methods. The son decides whether to search for his marriage partner
himself or delegate the search to his parents. If he searches himself, his objective function is
U  max
;hf
( + )f(hf ; hm)  mc(; hf ; hm):
The corresponding optimal choices of his potential wifes characteristics resulted from searching by himself
are denoted by  and hf , which are characterized by the following rst order conditions
f(hf ; hm)  mc1(; hf ; hm) = 0; (1)
( + )f1(hf ; hm)  mc2(; hf ; hm) = 0: (2)
If his parents manage the search, their objective function is
eU  max
;hf
[ + ( + )]f(hf ; hm)  ps(; hf ; hp);
where the corresponding optimal choices are denoted by  and hf . The necessary conditions that char-
acterize  and hf are
f(hf ; hm)  ps1(; hf ; hp) = 0; (3)
[ + ( + )]f1(hf ; hm)  ps2(; hf ; hp) = 0: (4)
It is not di¢ cult to see that in general the optimal wives are di¤erent between these two search processes.
Then the sons choice problem is
maxfU  ( + )f(hf ; hm)  mc(; hf ; hm);U  ( + )f(hf ; hm)g; (5)
where the second term is the sons net utility when his parents do the search for him. Searching by himself
will prevail if U  U, while his parents will be delegated to do the search if the opposite U < U
is true.6 The main implications of the optimal solution to this problem are summarized by the following
proposition.
6 If parents can arrange the marriage without consent from the son, as is the case in traditional society, the parents are
the nal decision maker and their objective function would be maxf[ + ( + )]f(hf ; hm); [ + ( + )]f(hf ; hm)  
ps(
; hf ; hp)g.
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Proposition 1 (1) E¤ects of Parental Involvement: The emotional output and the overall match quality
are lower under parental involvement, i.e., f(hf ; hm) > 
f(hf ; hm) and ( + 
)f(hf ; hm)  ( +
)f(hf ; hm) hold, respectively, but it is possible that the couples joint household production is higher, i.e.,
f(hf ; hm)  f(hf ; hm) may be true.
(2) Adverse Selection of Individuals: There exists a unique threshold value h#m of the sons human capital
level such that he will choose to search marriage partner himself if hm  h#m, while he will delegate his
parents to do the search for him if hm < h#m, where h
#
m increases with hp,  and m.
(3) Positive Selection of Parents: There exists a unique threshold value h#p of the parents competence
level such that they will be delegated to do the search i¤ hp > h#p , where h
#
p increases with hm but decreases
with  and m.
This proposition suggests that the e¤ects of parental involvement in marriage search can be di¤erent for
the two dimensions of marriage output: It is always negative for the emotional output, which is driven by
the fact that the matching quality  is idiosyncratic to the couple and thus not easily observed or shared
by others; the e¤ect on the economic output, however, can be either negative or positive. The reason for a
positive e¤ect is because the household output can be shared among family members and thus parents have
more incentives to care about the potential wifes human capital. On the contrary, parental involvement
could have a negative e¤ect on the economic output and is still an optimal choice from the sons perspective
if parental matchmaking leads to substantial savings in search cost.
Proposition 1 also suggests that parental involvement in marital search is endogenous; it is more likely
to happen when the sons human capital level hm is lower or the searching cost m is higher, and when
his parents benet more from the household public good (when  is higher) and have lower searching costs
(when hp is higher and p is lower). In other words, in a xed marriage market, there are two sources of
self-selection in the choice of marital search methods: one is from the son and the other is from the parents;
a young man with a lower human capital and more capable or more motivated parents is more likely to rely
on his parents to search for wife.
Figure 1 illustrates the positive relationship between h#m and hp and how their combination a¤ects the
endogenous choice of marital searching methods. In the graph, a young man with human capital h
0
m and
parentse¤ectiveness h0p, for example, will optimally choose to rely on his parents to search for a potential
wife because his human capital is lower than the threshold level h#m corresponding to his parentse¤ectiveness
h0p. This choice can also be understood from the alternative perspective: given his human capital level h
0
m,
his parents are competent enough (since h0p is higher than the corresponding threshold level h
#
p ) to nd a
good wife for him so that he does not need to bother searching by himself.
The general equilibrium e¤ect of the marriage market matching, though not directly considered, is im-
plicitly taken into account in the model. Specically, the search cost may reect such e¤ect. For example,
the change in the common cost parameters m and p should not a¤ect an individuals optimal choices of
wife quality given his search method; the reason is that, since the marriage market (i.e., the pool of eligible
wives) is xed, the same change in search cost for everyone does not a¤ect any individual mans relative
ranking of desirability in the eye of eligible wives (in other words, the feasible set of his optimization problem
is still the same as before), and thus should not a¤ect an individuals optimal choice of wife.
Empirical Implications. If individuals make di¤erent choices of match-making methods randomly, then
the OLS regressions should yield unbiased estimates for the negative e¤ects of parental involvement on the
emotional output and for ambiguous e¤ects on joint incomes, after controlling for individual characteristics
as well as relevant marriage market conditions that may also directly a¤ect marital outcomes. The potential
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Figure 1: Endogenous Choice of Match-Making Methods
problem, however, is that the choice of search methods may not only be a¤ected by random elements, but
also by the individuals and his parents characteristics as reected by the adverse and positive selection
problems in Proposition 1.
If we can perfectly control parentscharacteristics (hp; ), then the average marital quality of husbands
with parental involvement must be lower than others even when their wives are of exactly the same quality
because the husbands in the former group have lower human capital (hm < h#m); this is the adverse selection
e¤ect of sons. In contrast, when the husbands characteristics are fully controlled, those with parental
involvement must have had more competent parents (hp > h#p ) with respect to searching, which implies
that their wifes overall quality, especially their human capital level hf , may be higher than others, and
hence their marital quality may also be higher; this is the positive selection e¤ect of parents. And so without
properly accounting for these two sources of the endogeneity problem, the OLS estimate of the e¤ect of
parental involvement in match-making can be either higher or lower than the true e¤ect, depending on
which e¤ect is dominant.
The main challenge in the empirical strategy is how to tease out the endogenous selection e¤ects from the
true e¤ect of parental involvement on marital quality. Our approach is to use an instrumental variable that
a¤ects the choice of search method but not the marital outcomes directly. Consider two identical marriage
markets A and B that are mutually exclusive. Due to some exogenous shocks, the threshold level of the sons
human capital h#m as a function of parentscharacteristics hp shifts down in market A but not in B. This
can be achieved in the model, for example, by a lower m, which a¤ects the search costs of all individuals
in a marriage market. As one can see in Figure 1, this downward shift in market A will induce a group of
young men, who are between the new and old threshold curves, to change their search method from parental
involvement to self-search; as a result, identical individuals make di¤erent choices: those in market A have
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parental involvement while those in market B adopt self-search. Comparing their di¤erence in marital quality
will thus lead to the true e¤ect of parental involvement on marital quality. This is the main prediction of
the model, which will be tested using data.
3 Data Description and Preliminary Evidence
We use the Study of the Status of Contemporary Chinese Women (SSCCW), a data set collected jointly
by the Population Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Science and the Population Council of United
Nations in 1991 (Institute of Population Studies, 1993). SSCCW collects information on personal traits,
marriage characteristics, fertility, work, intra-family arrangements, and gender norms. Husband and wives
were interviewed separately for the same questions.
The survey used stratied random sampling to select households from seven areas: one municipality
(Shanghai) and 6 provinces (Guandong, Sichuan, Jilin, Shandong, Shanxi, and Ninxia). They scatter across
China in the southeast, south, southwest, northeast, east, middle and north, respectively, and are often far
away from each other given the size of China. As migration across di¤erent provinces was not common in
China by 1991, each province can be regarded as a separate marriage market. Another important dimension
that cuts across areas is the urban-rural distinction in that the rigid Hukou system e¤ectively blocked
people from migrating between cities and countryside. Furthermore, the economic structure and life styles
are dramatically di¤erent between urban and rural areas, which will in many important ways a¤ect both
match-making methods and marriage outcomes.
3.1 Measures of Matching-Making Methods and Marital Outcomes
The question on match-making methods asked how an individual met his or her spouse initially. There are
four original categories in the data, where 35.2% of the sample were introduced by parents or relatives, 36.6%
by friends, 27.3% by themselves, and 0.8% by other means. We treat the rst two categories as searching by
parents for two reasons; one is technical, as the further distinction between introduction by parents and by
relatives is not available in the data, and the other is conceptual, because relatives are an integrated part
of the parentssocial networks to facilitate the search process. A perhaps more debatable decision is that
we do not di¤erentiate couples initially introduced by friends from those who met by themselves. The main
reason is that these two groups are similar in terms of our theoretical model: In both cases, it is the young
people themselves, not their parents, that conducted the search process and bore the search cost; whether
explicitly introduced by friends or not at the initial stage is thus not essential to our purpose. And indeed,
empirically these two groups are very similar.7 And nally, since our main focus is on the e¤ect of parental
involvement versus self search in the match-making process, we drop the few couples introduced through
other means. We then construct a dummy variable Parental Involvement that equals 1 if a couple were
introduced by parents or relatives and 0 if by friends or themselves.
Marriage outcomes are represented by money and love as in the model. The economic output is measured
by the joint couple income; the emotional aspect of the marriage output, however, is di¢ cult to accurately
quantify. In the following, we discuss in detail an indicator of harmony within a couple and argue it is a
plausible proxy for the love dimension of marriage.
7One may conjecture that the human capital of couples introduced by friends are lower than that by self-match; if this is the
case, then treating them together should introduce downward biases to the scale of estimated e¤ects of parental involvement
and thus make it less likely to nd any signicant results.
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The survey question most closely related to the emotional aspect of marriage asked: How do you usually
reconcile with your spouse when you have conicts?We dene a harmony index as follows: it is equal to 2
if the couple reported no conicts, 1 if conicts are usually solved by mutual compromise, and 0 if conicts
are solved by either unilateral compromise or third-party mediation by family members, relatives or friends.
Third-party involvement in conict solution is a rare event in the data (only 3% reported so) so we do not
distinguish it from unilateral compromise. From the best to the worst, the composition in the whole sample
is 26%, 49%, and 25%, respectively.
In our view, the rationale for this harmony index is consistent with the essential meaning of a couples
matching quality, which means that couples with better matching quality are less likely to have conicts
and more capable of solving conicts in an e¤ective way; and so the implication is that no conicts is
the best outcome, while mutual compromisecomes next in the ranking, which is arguably less costly or
more e¤ectively than unilateral compromise and third-party mediation. To be clear, we are aware of the
possibility that in some isolated scenarios, unilateral compromise may be preferred or more e¤ective, but
as the routine mode of conict resolution within the couple, mutual compromise, whether in substantial or
symbolic ways, seems to indicate a more harmonious relationship. We also acknowledge that the cardinal
denition of the harmony index may be arbitrary even if the ordinal rank is correct. Later on we perform
robustness checks that (1) focus on whether a couple has any conict and ignore how the couple resolve the
conict; and (2) treat harmony index as ordinal instead of cardinal. Results are similar.
In the context of our data, we argue that the above-mentioned harmony index is a more appropriate
measure of the emotional output of marriage than others used in the literature. In modern western societies,
for example, whether a marriage ends up in divorce is a natural measure of marital quality. The extremely
low divorce rate in China by 1991, however, renders this measure less useful: Chinas divorce rate was 0:42
per 1000 couples in 1982, 0:71 in 1990, and 0:87 in 1995; they are well below the corresponding numbers in
many countries in 1995, which are 4:44 in the United States, 1:59 in Japan and 1:57 in Taiwan (Zeng and
Wu 2000).8 Aside from divorce, the existing literature also uses the length of marriage as proxy for marital
outcome. With divorce out of the question for all except extreme cases, the length of marriage is not a good
proxy anymore as it is merely the di¤erence between the age at marriage and the survey time, and it is hard
to believe that couples married earlier should be happier.
Other ways to measure the emotional life of marriage are via survey questions about the respondents
happiness about the marriage (Weiss and Willis 1997), feeling of love (Blood 1967), and satisfaction about
various activities within the marriage (Xu & Whyte 1990, Blood 1967). In our data, there is no question
that directly asked about marital satisfaction. However, to the extent that marital satisfaction is negatively
correlated with the existence of conicts and that it is a¤ected by the usual methods of conict resolution,
our harmony index can serve as a good proxy (Gilford and Bengtson 1979, Johnson et al. 1986, Xu 1996).
3.2 Parental Involvement and Marriage Outcomes
There is a fair amount of heterogeneity in terms of matching-making methods and marriage outcomes
across area and cohort. As shown in Table 1, 40% couples in the whole sample got married under parental
involvement and the rest 60% through searching by themselves. The average harmony level is 1.00 and the
mean log income per couple is 8.81. The di¤erences across regions are large: for example, the proportion
8When the divorce rate is used as an indicator of marriage quality, the result is consistent with ours; Zeng and Wu (2000),
for example, nd that marriages arranged by parents are more likely to end in divorce than those matched by the couples
themselves.
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with parental involvement ranges from 29% in Guangdong to 64% in Ningxia province. The corresponding
average harmony levels in these two places are 1.04 and 0.60, respectively, while their average log incomes
are 9.45 and 7.97, respectively. Across cohort, younger couples (those below 40 years old) on average are
less likely to rely on parental involvement, though the trend is not monotonic; in contrast, there is a clear
pattern that younger cohorts are less harmonious and earn lower incomes, which may not be surprising given
their age di¤erences.
The largest gap, however, lies in the rural-urban comparison, where 58% couples in the rural area had
parental involvement in match-making, while only 19% in the urban area did so. The income gap is also the
largest, where the log income per couple is 7.90 in rural and 9.92 in urban areas, which reects the underlying
gaps in economic structures and human capital levels as well as other fundamentals. Interestingly, they do
not di¤er much in terms of marital harmony level, which is 0.99 in rural and 1.02 in urban areas. These
di¤erences are statistically signicant.
The lower panel in Table 1 contrasts the two groups with di¤erent match-making methods. Across all
areas, couples with parental involvement are on average less harmonious (0.97 versus 1.03) and having lower
incomes (8.26 versus 9.19) than those that underwent searching themselves, and these di¤erences are highly
signicant. The same pattern applies to the rural area, where the between-group contrast is 0.96 versus 1.02
in harmony, and 7.80 versus 8.03 in log income. In the urban areas, couples with parental involvement also
have lower harmony levels (0.98 versus 1.03), but slightly higher incomes (9.95 versus 9.91) than others.
This rst look at the data suggests some systematic association between parental involvement and mar-
riage outcomes. These primitive results turn out to be robust to controlling various variables and the
treatment of the endogeneity issue.
3.3 Endogeneity of Parental Involvement
Table 2 shows that the choice of match-making methods di¤ers systematically across individuals. In par-
ticular, individuals with lower human capital and whose parents gain more from household production are
more likely to rely on parental involvement, which is consistent with Proposition 1.
The top panel in Table 2 shows that, compared with those who have conducted spouse search themselves,
individuals with parental involvement in match-making have on average about 2.5 years less in schooling,
were married about 2 years earlier, have parents with fewer years of schooling, and are much more likely to
live with parents after marriage. These di¤erences are all statistically signicant. Note that the e¤ects of
parental education on the match-making choice may come from opposite directions. For example, parents
with better education tend to rely less on married children for nancial support, which should reduce the
likelihood of parental involvement in match-making; but the opposite e¤ect can happen if parental education
increases parentscompetence in helping children nd a good spouse. And so the overall e¤ect of parent
education on the choice of match-making methods can be ambiguous. Nonetheless, the evidence is quite
clear that parental involvement in match-making is not random.
Since it is impossible to measure and control all the relevant individual and parental characteristics that
may a¤ect the choice of match-making, the estimated e¤ect of parental involvement is likely to be biased in
the OLS regressions due to the problem of omitted variables. To address this issue, we use the tradition of
parental involvement in a marriage market as the instrumental variable for an individuals choice of parental
involvement. Specically, the tradition is measured by the prevalence of parental involvement in the earlier
cohort (those who are three to six year older and of same gender) in the same area, where an area is a specic
province-urban combination. For instance, for a husband j of 30 years old in the rural area of province i,
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the proportion of all husbands in the cohort of 33-36 years old in the rural area of the same province that
adopted parental involvement will be used as the tradition measure for j. Since the group size drops a lot
after age 55, the measure of tradition for individuals older than 55 by gender-urban-province becomes less
justiable, and we no longer use them in our regression analysis; as this group is quite small, about 100
couples, our results are not likely to be a¤ected by dropping them.9 The summary statistics for this nal
sample are in Table A1 in the appendix.
As shown in the lower panel of Table 2, an individuals choice of parental involvement in match-making is
indeed signicantly and positively a¤ected by the tradition of parental involvement in the relevant marriage
market, and the estimated e¤ect of such tradition is larger for women. The coe¢ cients of other variables
are also quite intuitive: an individuals schooling level has a negative and signicant e¤ect on parental
involvement for both men and women, while the e¤ect of good health status is negative for both but signicant
only for men. Parentseducation is not signicant, which does not necessarily mean no e¤ects, because, as
discussed earlier, their multiple inuences can operate in opposite directions. And no signicant di¤erence
is found across age or cohort. Males in urban areas are less likely to use parental involvement, while the
urban-rural di¤erence is much smaller and not signicant for females.
The tradition of parental involvement as dened above increases the probability of parental involvement
possibly due to social learning or the inclination to follow the social custom (Cheung 1972). Both mechanisms
suggest that in a society with a stronger tradition of parental matchmaking, parents have a greater advantage
in search cost and this advantage applies to every parent regardless of the parents or childs individual
characteristics. The exclusion criterion for the tradition to be a valid instrumental variable for parental
involvement is also likely to hold. Except through parental involvement indirectly, it should not have a direct
e¤ect on an individual couples marriage outcomes, especially after controlling individual characteristics, area
characteristics and cohort xed e¤ects. It is useful to note that this area-specic tradition is not a¤ected by
individual characteristics because Chinese people had little freedom in changing their residential location at
least up to 1991 due to the strict enforcement of the Hukou system in particular and the planning economy
in general. This is also evident in our data, where 91% have never changed residence since age 12, while only
7% moved once and 1.5% twice, and such change of location is mostly due to parentsor spousechange of
job.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 The Benchmark Results
The estimated e¤ects of parental involvement on marriage outcomes across all areas are shown in Table 3. The
upper left and right panels are based on husbands and wifes information, respectively, where the regressions
do not control for the spouses characteristics because they are endogenous to the match-making choices.
The common control variables across these regressions include an individuals age, years of schooling, health
status, political party membership (whether the individual is a member of communist party, communist
youth league, or democratic party), religion (Muslim, Christian or catholic, Buddhist), ethnic (Han, Huei,
Korean, Manchurian), type of the rst job (state-owned sectors, individual farms or rms, collective rms,
joint ventures of foreign rms), years of schooling of both parents, and location characteristics including
whether the average education of parents is above the sample average, whether the average couple income
9We have indeed checked this by comparing the means of the sample and the OLS estimates with and without this oldest
cohort, and there is not much di¤erence.
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is higher than the sample average, and whether it is an urban or rural area.
The overall results across these two panels are very similar: The estimated coe¢ cients of parental in-
volvement are negative and statistically signicant for both harmony and income and across both OLS and
IV specications. And their scales in the IV estimation are also quite large. For example, based on the
IV results for husbands in the left panel, the estimated e¤ect of parental involvement on harmony is  0:92
of one standard deviation (SD), while the corresponding e¤ect on income is  0:76 SD of log income. The
corresponding e¤ects for wife in the right panel are  0:44 SD of harmony and  0:79 SD of log income. In
the rst stage regressions, the instrumental variable is highly signicant, and the F-statistics are quite high
(49 to 144), which minimizes the concern of weak instruments.
The absolute scales of IV estimates are much larger than the OLS estimates, which seems to suggest
that the adverse selection problem of sons is minor relative to the positive selection problem of parents
in the choice of parental involvement; in other words, the OLS estimates will underestimate the negative
e¤ects of parental involvement when those who eventually choose parental involvement are likely to have
more competent parents. Indeed, the positive selection of parents may be more salient given that very little
information about parents is controlled due to availability of data; as a matter of fact, only their education
levels are controlled.
The estimated coe¢ cients of other variables are also quite consistent across panels. For example, urban
couples on average have lower harmony levels but much higher incomes. The estimated e¤ects of years of
schooling on marital harmony form a U-shape, where the bottom is reached at about 12 years for husbands
and 8 years for wives based on the IV results in the left and right panels, respectively; in contrast, their
e¤ects on income form an inverted U-shape, where the top is reached at about 12 years for husbands and 8:5
years for wives. Another noticeable result is that couples in relatively richer provinces are more harmonious.
All of these e¤ects are statistically signicant. The e¤ects of good health are positive on both harmony and
income, which are highly signicant for wives, but for husbands they are signicant only for incomes.
One may have issues with the choice of control variables. Some may worry about the possible endogeneity
of certain variables such as ones years of schooling,10 health status, political and religious membership as
well as current job type, while others may think even more variables should be controlled. These concerns
are addressed in the bottom part of Table 3, where the left panel shows estimation results excluding all of
the potentially endogenous variables (years of schooling, health status, political party membership, religion,
and job), while the right panel shows results adding extra controls including detailed information of an
individuals spouse, di¤erences between husband and wife, and spouse selection criteria at marital searching
stage. For such robustness check purpose, we only show results based on the husbands information, since
those on the wife are very similar. In both panels, the estimated coe¢ cients of parental involvement are
still negative and highly signicant as before, where the IV estimates have even larger magnitudes, and the
F-statistics in the rst stage are also high enough. So our main results are robust to specic choices of
control variables.11
10The possibility that a persons education level is negatively correlated with ones unobserved attractiveness in the marriage
market is suggested by Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) for Philippines.
11Another potential problem is that the data do not have working hours and labor force participation status, which may
particularly bias the joint income regressions of urban couples. However, in the context of China, this is not likely to be a
serious matter because in China almost all women engaged in full time work at least up to the survey time 1991. For relevant
evidence on the almost full labor market participation of women see, for example, Huang et al. (2009).
12
4.2 The Rural-Urban Di¤erences
Table 4 presents estimation results highlighting di¤erences between rural and urban areas. The control
variables are the same as in the main result of Table 3. The upper panel adds a cross term parental
involvement*urban to the original specication in Table 3, allowing the e¤ects of parental match-making
to be di¤erent across rural and urban areas. The lower panel shows separate regression results for rural and
urban couples, allowing all coe¢ cients to be di¤erent. Since results are again similar when using di¤erent
sets of control variables for both specications, they are not shown in the table.
The estimated e¤ects of parental involvement in the upper panel are very similar to the benchmark results
in Table 3: They are negative and signicant for both marital harmony and joint couple incomes, for both
husbands and wives, and across OLS and IV specications. For marital harmony, the coe¢ cients of the
cross term are negative and often insignicant, suggesting little di¤erence across rural and urban areas. In
contrast, in the income regressions the coe¢ cients of the cross term are not only positive, but also having
magnitudes large enough to turn the overall e¤ect of parental match-making to positive for incomes of urban
couples; this is true in both OLS and IV specications, where the F-statistics in the rst stage regressions
range from 19 to 73. Based on the IV results in the left upper panel, the estimated e¤ects of parental
involvement for rural husbands are  0:88 SD of harmony and  1:13 SD of log income. The corresponding
e¤ects for urban husbands are  1:08 SD of harmony and 1:34 SD of log income.
Similar results are obtained in the lower panel when we separate the rural and urban couples into two
samples. That is, the e¤ects of parental match-making are negative for both harmony and incomes in
the rural area, while in the urban area it is negative for harmony but positive for couple incomes. The
instrumental variable is still signicant in the rst stage regressions, though the F-statistics (around 14)
are relatively low for the urban sample, indicating the possibility of the tradition variable being a weak
instrument in the urban area.12
Although the magnitudes of IV estimates are always larger than those of OLS (as in Table 3), the OLS
and IV di¤erence is more striking for urban income. We suspect this is because the percent of parental
involvement is much lower in urban and there is more income heterogeneity in urban areas. Both could
make the identication of the urban-specic e¤ect less robust. That being said, all the specications show
di¤erent signs of estimates for rural and urban income, which supports the theoretical prediction that parental
involvement could have positive or negative impacts on a couples joint income, though the impact on
marriage harmony is always negative.
One explanation for the rural-urban di¤erence in joint income is that urban parents are more competent
in identifying potential spouses with higher earning capabilities for their children, partly because urban
parents are better educated. Another possibility is that it may be easier for seasoned seniors to predict a
young persons earnings in urban areas, at least up to the survey time, which are determined more by the
type of rms they belong to than by their individual qualications, given that most urban rms were run by
the state and job security was very high (under the nick name iron bowl). Furthermore, the incomes in
the rural area are not easy to measure, especially when the couple lives together with other family members
in the same household; this is evident from the much lower explanation power of income regressions in the
rural area; for example, the R-squared in the OLS regression of incomes in the lower panel is 0:152 in the
rural area, while the corresponding number is 0:447 in the urban area. The fact that the magnitude of
the e¤ect for the income equation is much larger in the IV regressions than OLS seems to suggest that the
adverse selection problem is more severe in the income regression of urban areas; and this is consistent with
12Results for wives are similar and thus not shown.
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the observation that only 19% urban couples rely on parental involvement, while 58% rural couples do so
(see Table 1).
In summary, the e¤ect of parental involvement is negative on marital harmony in both rural and urban
areas, while its e¤ect on joint couple incomes is negative in the rural area but positive in the urban area.
More competent urban parents, higher heterogeneity of earning potential, and more severe adverse selection
problem for urban individuals may account for the di¤erent e¤ects of parental involvement on joint couple
incomes across rural and urban areas. Given that parental involvement is more prevalent but incomes are
much lower in the rural area, when combined together in the same regression as we have done in Table 3,
it is not surprising that the average e¤ect of parental involvement on income is negative and signicant;
that is, the overall result across all areas is not only driven by within-area heterogeneity but also by large
rural-urban gaps.
4.3 Robustness Check
In addition to using di¤erent control variables, we have also conducted various tests to check the robustness
of our main results in Table 3 and 4. Specically, weve tried constructing alternative measures of parental
involvement tradition and using di¤erent measures of the marriage harmony index. Our main results are
robust to these changes.
4.3.1 An Alternative Measure of Tradition as IV
Since there is no denite way to measure the tradition of parental involvement, the specic measure used
in our estimation may seem a little arbitrary. To check whether our main results are a¤ected by the choice
of IV, we construct an alternative measure of the tradition as the new IV, which is possibly more arbitrary
and much less nuanced than the one used before.
Given the age distribution of the sample, we divide individuals into 8 age cohorts in each marriage market
by province-urban units: the youngest cohort is of ages 18-25, the second youngest cohort is 26-30 years
old, followed by cohorts aged 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, and nally 56 and above. Then we use
the proportion of parental involvement among individuals with the same gender of cohort i + 2 as the new
measure of tradition for everyone in the current cohort i. For instance, the proportion of husbands adopting
parental involvement in the cohort of 41-45 years old will be used as the measure of tradition for all husbands
of 31-35 years old. Since there is no corresponding measure of tradition for the two oldest cohorts in our
sample, we have to drop them (those older than 50) in our regression analysis. And so the identication
comes from heterogeneity across 14 marriage markets and 6 cohorts.
The estimation results using this new IV are shown in Table 5, where the control variables are the same as
in our main results. Comparing the top panel of the overall results across areas with that in Table 3, there is
little di¤erence between the two, though not surprisingly, this new IV has lower explanation power than the
old one. The middle panel adds the cross term parental involvement*urbanto the pooled sample, while the
lower panel contrasts rural and urban areas for husbands; the regression results are qualitatively the same
and quantitatively similar as their counterparts in Table 4, where the negative e¤ect on marital harmony
for urban husbands is much more signicant than before. It is also useful to note that the F-statistics are
quite high in the urban regressions, which to some degree may alleviate the worry of weak instrument for the
urban area. In other words, our main results can be obtained by using a much cruder measure of tradition
as IV.
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4.3.2 An Alternative Measure of Harmony Index
With regard to the harmony index we used to measure the emotional output of marriage, one may argue
the ranking between mutual compromise and other ways of conict resolution is irrelevant as long as the
conict is resolved. To address this concern, we construct an alternative measure of harmony index, a dummy
variable that equals one if an individual reports no conict in marriage life. The Probit results are presented
in Table 6, where the standard errors in the IV specication are obtained by bootstrapping. The top panel
shows results across all areas, where the coe¢ cients of parental involvement are negative and signicant for
both husbands and wives, the same as our main results. The next two panels contrast rural with urban
areas, which exhibit the same pattern as before. These results suggest that our ndings are robust to the
exact measure of the harmony index.
In our main results, we treated the harmony index as a cardinal variable in order to use the standard IV
method, even though it is by denition an ordinal variable. To check the sensitivity of our results in this
regard, we redo the regression results for harmony by ordered probit; as shown in the bottom of Table 6,
they are indeed similar to the corresponding OLS results on harmony in Table 3 and Table 4.
4.4 Discussions and Further Evidence
Our main empirical results t well with the theoretical predictions of the model. The key prediction about the
agency cost of using parents as matchmakers is the negative e¤ect of parental involvement on the emotional
output of marriage, and it is indeed found across the board in our empirical analysis, which is robust to
various specications and regardless of whether the rural and urban areas are pooled together or separated.
The predicted e¤ect of parental involvement on the economic output of marriage, in contrast, can be either
negative or positive, depending on how competent parents are in searching. Both possibilities are realized
in the empirical results, where the e¤ect on joint couple incomes is negative in the rural area but positive in
the urban area.
A mechanism that may give rise to these results, as suggested by our theoretical model, is that match-
making by parental involvement tends to overemphasize the earning capability of a potential spouse, which
directly a¤ects household public goods that can be shared among extended family members, than what is
deemed optimal if one searches spouse on ones own. If this is true, then the spouse selection criteria should
also di¤er systematically by match-making methods. There is indeed supporting evidence on this matter,
which is shown in Table 7.
The seven variables listed at the top of Table 7 are spouse selection criteria considered at the match-
making stage. They are dummy variables equal to 1 if the specic trait was deemed one of the two most
important characteristics in selecting the marriage partner. Most people (75% of the sample) regard the
character of a spouse as one of the top two characteristics, the temperament of a spouse comes next (41%)
in popularity, good look is ranked the third (23%), and family background is the fourth (14%), which is
then followed by the education level, occupation, and political party membership in the order of popularity.
The next two rows compare spouse selection criteria between the two groups with di¤erent match-making
methods. The results show that individuals with parental involvement are more likely to treat family back-
grounds and good look as the top two selection criteria, while less likely to treat character and temperament
as well as others as the top two. These di¤erences are statistically signicant.
Further conrmation to such di¤erences is provided in the lower panel of Table 7, where the probit
regression results on these selection criteria have controlled many variables including individual, parental, and
provincial characteristics. The estimated e¤ects of parental involvement are positive on family backgrounds
15
while negative on character and temperament, and they are highly signicant; in contrast, the coe¢ cients
of parental involvement on other selection criteria are much smaller and statistically insignicant. The
coe¢ cients of other control variables in the probit regressions are also intuitive, suggesting that the analysis
does capture something relevant to decisions on spouse selection. For example, individuals in urban areas
emphasize much less on a potential spouses family backgrounds and good looks but more on the other
dimensions. Better educated individuals concern more about education but less about family backgrounds.
Compared with women, men emphasize more on good looks and temperament as well as character but less
on the other traits.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines a new aspect of marriage market - the match-making means - and investigates its e¤ects
on marital harmony and joint couple income. The method of match-making matters because it often leads
to a di¤erent choice of spouse and therefore a di¤erent life after marriage.
Specically, we show that parents involvement in the match-making process may distort the optimal
spouse choice in that they tend to emphasize more on the potential spouses earning abilities than match
quality or attraction between the couple. The rationale is that the joint income of married children can be
shared among extended family members more easily than mutual attraction or happiness felt by the couple
themselves. Put di¤erently, parents are often more willing to substitute love for money than the individuals
themselves. We nd supporting evidence for this prediction using a unique sample of Chinese couples in
the early 1990s: the estimated e¤ect of parental involvement is indeed negative for marital harmony in both
urban and rural areas; in comparison, its e¤ect on income is negative for rural couples but positive for urban
couples. These results are already evident by comparing the means of the two groups using di¤erent match-
making methods, and are further conrmed in various regressions. We also use an instrumental variable
approach to address the self-selection issues of both individuals and parents, and obtain qualitatively similar
results.
In future research, it would be interesting to investigate whether parental involvement also a¤ects other
aspects of marriage life. For example, it seems possible that, given the strong preference of grandchildren
and especially grandsons in China, couples married with parents as matchmakers may be more likely to
have more children and in particular more sons; and they should also marry and start to have children at
younger ages. Another interesting topic would be to explore the potentially positive relationship between
the prevalence of parental involvement and income inequality across area and over time.
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APPENDIX
Proof. The optimal values of  and hf are jointly determined by (1) and (2). Note that 
 can be solved
from condition (1) as a function of hf , which can then be plugged in (2) to solve h

f . The optimal values of
 and hf are jointly determined by (3) and (4), based on which we get @
=@hp > 0 and @hf =@hp > 0
by Cramers rule:
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where jHj is the determinant of Hessian matrix
jHj =

( )
 ps11
(+)
f1   ps12
f1   ps12
(+)
[ + ( + )]f11   ps22
( )
 ;
and jHj > 0 is assumed for the existence of optimal solutions. We can also get @=@ > 0 and @hf =@ in
a similar way. We assume f1   ps12  0, which essentially means that @2 eU=@@hf  0; and then based
on (3) we have
@
@hf
=
f1(h

f ; hm)  ps12(; hf ; hm)
s11
> 0:
Comparing conditions (1) and (3), we can see that (hf ) > (hf ) must hold, conditional on the same
level of hf ; the reason is that the rst terms in both conditions are independent of  while the second terms
are strictly increasing in it, which combined with the assumption ps1  mc1 will lead to (hf ) > (hf ).
Given the same , we may have hf > h

f if  < (1   )( + ) and/or mc2  ps2, in other words, if
parents do not benet too much from the daughter-in-laws human capital hf or if their marginal searching
cost with respect to hf is not lower than the sons. The opposite result hf  hf is otherwise possible.
Since the searching cost is always positive,
( + )f(hf ; hm) > ( + 
)f(hf ; hm) (6)
must hold, which then implies  >  and f(hf ; hm) > 
f(hf ; hm); the reason is as follows. (i)
If hf > h

f , then 
(hf ) > 
(hf ) > 
(hf ) holds, and it implies 
 > , where the rst inequality
follows (hf ) > (hf ) and the second follows @(hf )=@hf > 0. And f(hf ; hm) > 
f(hf ; hm)
follows directly from hf > h

f and 
 > . (ii) If hf  hf , then we have
( + )f(hf ; hm)  ( + )f(hf ; hm) > ( + )f(hf ; hm);
where the rst and third terms imply  > ; the rst inequality holds because hf  hf , while the second
inequality is based on (6). And following similar arguments we can derive f(hf ; hm) > 
f(hf ; hm) by
comparing the rst and third terms in
f(hf ; hm) + 
f(hf ; hm)  ( + )f(hf ; hm) > ( + )f(hf ; hm):
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Based on (5), the utility di¤erence between self and parentssearching is
  U   U = ( + )f(hf ; hm)  mc(; hf ; hm)  ( + )f(hf ; hm);
which is strictly decreasing in hp because
@=@hp =  f(hf ; hm)@=@hp   ( + )f1(hf ; hm)@hf =@hp < 0:
We get @=@hm > 0 for the following reason. Note that
@=@hm =
@U
@hm
  @( + )f(hf ; hm)=@hm;
where
@U
@hm
=
@( + )f(hf ; hm)
@hm
  @mc(
; hf ; hm)
@hm
(7)
= ( + )f2(hf ; hm)  mc3(; hf ; hm) > 0 (8)
by the Envelop Theorem. Since
@2U
@hm@
= f2(hf ; hm)  mc31(; hf ; hm) > 0;
we have
@U
@hm
j(;hf ) >
@U
@hm
j(;hf ) > @( + )f(hf ; hm)=@hm; (9)
where the rst inequality is because and  > , and the second inequality is because the second term of
@U
@hm
in (8) is positive. (i) If hf > h

f , then @
2( + )f(hf ; hm)=@hm@hf = f12(hf ; hm) > 0 implies
@( + )f(hf ; hm)=@hm > @( + 
)f(hf ; hm)=@hm;
which combined with the inequality in (9) implies
@U
@hm
j(;hf ) > @( + )f(hf ; hm)=@hm;
and this leads to
@=@hm =
@U
@hm
  @( + )f(hf ; hm)=@hm > 0:
(ii) When hf  hf is the case, the result can be derived in a similar way due to
@( + )f(hf ; hm)
@hm
<
@( + )f(hf ; hm)
@hm
  @mc(
; hf ; hm)
@hm
<
@U
@hm
j(;hf );
where the rst inequality holds because of  <  and  @mc(; hf ; hm)=@hm > 0, while the second
inequality holds because (; hf ) is the optimal choice to maximize U
 than (; hf ); comparing the rst
and the third terms we get @=@hm > 0:
So the threshold h#p is uniquely determined by
 = ( + )f(hf ; hm)  mc(; hf ; hm)  ( + (h#p ))f(hf (h#p ); hm) = 0:
Based on this identity, we get
@h#p
@hm
=  @=@hm
@=@hp
> 0;
@h#p
@
=   @=@
@=@hp
=  f(h

f ; hm)@
=@ + ( + )f1(hf ; hm)@h

f =@
 @=@hp < 0;
@h#p
@m
=  @=@m
@=@hp
=
 c(; hf ; hm)
 @=@hp < 0;
The comparative statics for the threshold level h#m can be derived in a similar manner.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 Number of 
Observations 
Parental 
Involvement 
Harmony 
Index 
Log Income  
for Couple  
The Whole Sample 17330 .40 (.49) 1.00 (.72) 8.81 (1.23) 
By Province: 
Guangdong 2822 .29 (.46) 1.04 (.63) 9.45 (1.32) 
Shanghai 2966 .30 (.46) 1.13 (.75) 8.48 (.41) 
Sichuan  2334 .34 (.47) .89 (.71) 8.99 (1.24) 
Shandong  2574 .39 (.49) 1.18 (.72) 8.99 (1.20) 
Shaanxi  2872 .47 (.50) 1.04 (.72) 8.76 (1.38) 
Jilin  2192 .50 (.50) .85 (.72) 8.72 (1.21) 
Ningxia  1570 .64 (.48) .60 (.72) 7.97 (1.21) 
By Cohort: 
<30 years old 4227 .41 (.49) .96 (.72) 8.52 (1.20) 
30-40 years old 7172 .38 (.49) .98 (.71) 8.86 (1.18) 
40-50 years 4492 .44 (.49) 1.04 (.71) 8.93 (1.24) 
Above 50 years old 1439 .41 (.49) 1.10 (.73) 9.09 (1.40) 
By Urban: 
Rural 9502 .58 (.49) .99 (.71) 7.90 (.68) 
Urban 7828 .19 (.39) 1.02 (.73) 9.92 (.76) 
Difference  
.393*** 
(.007) 
-.039*** 
(.011) 
-.933*** 
(.018) 
Marriage Outcomes by Matchmaking Method 
All Areas: 
Parental Involvement   .97 (.009) 8.26 (.013) 
Self Search   1.03 (.007) 9.19 (.012) 
Difference   
-.059*** 
(.011) 
-.227*** 
(.014) 
Rural:     
Parental Involvement   .96 (.71) 7.80 (.67) 
Self Search   1.02 (.70) 8.03 (.66) 
Difference   
-.052*** 
(.015) 
-.227*** 
(.014) 
Urban:     
Parental Involvement   .98 (.73) 9.95 (.71) 
Self Search   1.03 (.72) 9.91 (.77) 
Difference 
  
-.051** 
(.021) 
.037* 
(.021) 
Note: The unit of observation is individual respondent. The sample excludes couples 
that one of them remarried or that the matching mode was missing or “others.” *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Endogenous Parental Involvement 
 
 Individual and Parental Attributes by Matchmaking Method 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 Years of 
Schooling 
Age at 
Marriage 
Mother’s 
Schooling 
Father’s 
Schooling 
Live with Parents 
after Marriage 
Parental 
Involvement 
6.48 (3.90) 22.93 (3.66) 1.40 (2.60) 3.23 (3.49) .65 (.48) 
Self Search 8.93 (3.59) 24.64 (3.53) 2.73 (3.48) 5.00 (3.89) .46 (.50) 
Difference 
-2.454*** 
(.059) 
-1.708*** 
(.056) 
-1.341*** 
(.046) 
-1.769*** 
(.057) 
.187*** 
(.008) 
 Parental Involvement: Probit 
 Husband Wife 
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement 
1.339*** 
(.201) 
1.934*** 
(.170) 
Urban 
-.510*** 
(.102) 
-.047 
(.084) 
Younger than 35 years old 
-.008 
(.061) 
.048 
(.056) 
Age 
-.004 
(.021) 
-.001 
(.017) 
Age Squared 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
Years of Schooling 
-.034*** 
(.016) 
-.045*** 
(.012) 
Schooling Squared 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
Good Health 
-.132*** 
(.039) 
-.019 
(.033) 
Mother Schooling 
.010 
(.007) 
-.004 
(.007) 
Father Schooling 
-.005 
(.007) 
.008 
(.006) 
Province with Higher Parental 
Education Levels 
-.156*** 
(.046) 
.028 
(.045) 
Rich Province 
-.001 
(.037) 
-.017 
(.035) 
Observations 7177 8157 
Pseudo R2 .138 .162 
Note: The unit of observation is individual respondent. The other control variables include 
political party membership variables (whether the individual is a communist party member, 
communist youth league, or a democratic party member), religion (Muslim, Christian or 
catholic, Buddhist), ethnic (Han, Huei, Korean, Manchurian), and dummy variables for the 
type of first job. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3: Benchmark Results 
Note: The other controls include cohort dummies, political party membership variables (whether the individual is a 
communist party member, communist youth league, or a democratic party member), religion (Muslim, Christian or 
catholic, Buddhist), ethnic (Han, Huei, Korean, Manchurian), and the types of first job. The extra controls in the last 
panel include detailed information on an individual’s spouse and selection criteria. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Husband Wife 
 Marital Harmony Couple Income Marital Harmony Couple Income 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.063*** 
(.020) 
-.659*** 
(.217) 
-.071*** 
(.019) 
-.925*** 
(.236) 
-.032* 
(.018) 
-.434*** 
(.124) 
-.077*** 
(.017) 
-.973*** 
(.146) 
Urban 
-.063* 
(.036) 
-.254*** 
(.078) 
1.795*** 
(.039) 
1.527*** 
(.083) 
-.040 
(.030) 
-.061 
(.044) 
1.867*** 
(.030) 
1.638*** 
(.049) 
Age 
-.015 
(.011) 
-.014 
(.012) 
.021** 
(.010) 
.024** 
(.012) 
-.005 
(.010) 
-.004 
(.010) 
.042*** 
(.009) 
.046*** 
(.010) 
Age Squared 
.000* 
(.000) 
.000* 
(.000) 
-.000* 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000*** 
(.000) 
-.000*** 
(.000) 
Years of 
Schooling 
-.015* 
(.009) 
-.025** 
(.010) 
.065*** 
(.009) 
.049*** 
(.010) 
-.016*** 
(.006) 
-.027** 
(.007) 
.058*** 
(.006) 
.034*** 
(.008) 
Schooling 
Squared 
.001** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
-.002*** 
(.000) 
-.002*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.002*** 
(.000) 
-.003*** 
(.000) 
-.002*** 
(.000) 
Good Health 
.039** 
(.020) 
.019 
(.022) 
.169*** 
(.019) 
.140*** 
(.023) 
.090*** 
(.017) 
.090*** 
(.017) 
.153*** 
(.016) 
.150*** 
(.018) 
Mother 
Schooling 
.002 
(.004) 
.004 
(.004) 
-.004 
(.003) 
-.000 
(.004) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
Father 
Schooling 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.004) 
.007** 
(.003) 
.005 
(.003) 
-.000 
(.003) 
.000 
(.003) 
.007*** 
(.003) 
.008*** 
(.003) 
Province w/ 
Higher Parental 
Education 
-.050** 
(.024) 
-.082*** 
(.028) 
.018 
(.022) 
-.030 
(.028) 
-.030 
(.023) 
-.037 
(.024) 
.012 
(.021) 
-.003 
(.025) 
Rich Province 
.062*** 
(.019) 
.050*** 
(.021) 
.488*** 
(.018) 
.477*** 
(.021) 
.105*** 
(.018) 
.094*** 
(.019) 
.484*** 
(.018) 
.461*** 
(.021) 
Observations 6887 6882 7183 7177 7742 7741 8158 8157 
Adjusted R2 .021 - .721 .636 .031 - .725 .628 
First Stage Regression of Parental Involvement     
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement 
.522*** 
(.070) 
 
.474*** 
(.068) 
 
.736*** 
(.061) 
 
.694*** 
(.059) 
F-statistic in the First Stage 56.34  49.39  144.96  137.22 
 Husband 
 Fewer Control Variables More Control Variables 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.049*** 
(.018) 
-.913*** 
(.218) 
-.086*** 
(.017) 
-1.433*** 
(.250) 
-.055*** 
(.020) 
-.799*** 
(.307) 
-.047** 
(.018) 
-1.177*** 
(.358) 
Urban 
.004 
(.020) 
-.268*** 
(.072) 
1.902*** 
(.018) 
1.476*** 
(.080) 
-.106*** 
(.038) 
-.272*** 
(.079) 
1.752*** 
(.041) 
1.498*** 
(.090) 
Observations 8051 8046 8462 8456 6887 6882 7183 7177 
Adjusted R2 .015 - .698 .464 .040 - .738 .592 
F-statistic in the First Stage 61.91  64.43  30.36  26.34 
Table 4: Rural vs. Urban 
 Husband Wife 
 Marital Harmony Couple Income Marital Harmony Couple Income 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.070*** 
(.025) 
-.636*** 
(.214) 
-.132*** 
(.024) 
-1.385*** 
(.286) 
-.027 
(.022) 
-.375*** 
(.121) 
-.141*** 
(.021) 
-1.337*** 
(.180) 
Parental-
Involvement 
*Urban 
-.019 
(.041) 
-.138 
(.385) 
.162*** 
(.037) 
3.038*** 
(.421) 
-.014 
(.038) 
-.833* 
(.450) 
.189*** 
(.035) 
5.133*** 
(.783) 
Urban 
-.068* 
(.038) 
-.226** 
(.100) 
1.752*** 
(.041) 
.932*** 
(.126) 
.044 
(.032) 
.124 
(.100) 
1.811*** 
(.032) 
.481*** 
(.164) 
Observations 6887 6882 7183 7177 7742 7741 8158 8157 
Adjusted R2 .021 - .722 .487 .031 . .726 .029 
F-statistics in the First Stage 
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement 
28.30   24.69  73.84  69.32 
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement*Urban 
23.92  26.04  19.33  20.80 
 Husband 
 Rural Urban 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.067*** 
(.025) 
-.628** 
(.251) 
-.111*** 
(.022) 
-3.262*** 
(.601) 
-.053 
(.033) 
-.757 
(.512) 
.033 
(.027) 
2.846*** 
(.867) 
Observations 3,189 3,189 3,398 3,398 3,689 3,693 3,785 3,779 
Adjusted R2 .036 - .152 - .016 . .447 . 
First Stage Regression of Parental Involvement     
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement 
.578*** 
(.095) 
 
.521*** 
(.092) 
 
.389*** 
(.104) 
 
.386*** 
(.103) 
F-statistic in the First Stage 36.86  31.98  13.94  14.16 
Note: The other control variables are the same as in Table 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 5: Different IV 
 All Areas 
 Husband Wife 
 Marital Harmony Couple Income Marital Harmony Couple Income 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.063*** 
(.021) 
-.860*** 
(.303) 
-.067*** 
(.019) 
-.594** 
(.290) 
-.033* 
(.019) 
-.547*** 
(.174) 
-.083*** 
(.017) 
-.964*** 
(.192) 
Urban 
-.064* 
(.037) 
-.315*** 
(.104) 
1.802*** 
(.040) 
1.634*** 
(.097) 
-.043 
(.031) 
-.087 
(.055) 
1.857*** 
(.030) 
1.625*** 
(.059) 
Observations 6381 6369 6657 6643 7426 7420 7826 7818 
Adjusted R2 .021 - .718 .682 .031 . .724 .625 
First Stage Regression of Parental Involvement     
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement 
.397*** 
(.069) 
 
.335*** 
(.067) 
 
.527*** 
(.058) 
 
.486*** 
(.056) 
F-statistic in the First Stage 33.05  24.98  83.49  75.83 
 All Areas with Parental-Involvement*Urban 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.068*** 
(.026) 
-.892** 
(.364) 
-.127*** 
(.025) 
-1.545*** 
(.500) 
-.029 
(.023) 
-.445*** 
(.164) 
-.143*** 
(.021) 
-1.517*** 
(.258) 
Parental-
Involvement 
*Urban 
.014 
(.043) 
.074 
(.385) 
.168*** 
(.038) 
2.222*** 
(.433) 
-.013 
(.039) 
-.917 
(.4607) 
.181*** 
(.035) 
5.180*** 
(.899) 
Urban 
-.067* 
(.039) 
-.336** 
(.159) 
1.759*** 
(.041) 
1.017*** 
(.216) 
.046 
(.033) 
.121 
(.123) 
1.805*** 
(.032) 
.449*** 
(.186) 
Observations 6381 6369 6657 6643 7426 7420 7826 7818 
Adjusted R2 .021 - .719 .545 .031 . .725 .031 
F-statistics in the First Stage     
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement 18.16  15.08  44.29  39.31 
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement*Urban 
27.73  28.61  12.48  13.78 
 Husband 
 Rural Urban 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.067*** 
(.026) 
-1.285** 
(.636) 
-.104*** 
(.022) 
-7.055** 
(2.892) 
-.054 
(.035) 
-.769** 
(.382) 
.037 
(.028) 
1.113*** 
(.362) 
Observations 3,025 3,025 3,219 3,219 3,356 3,344 3,438 3,424 
Adjusted R2 .038 - .153 - .015 . .436 .173 
First Stage Regression of Parental Involvement     
Tradition of Parental 
Involvement 
.310*** 
(.106)  
.247*** 
(.101)  
.486*** 
(.096)  
.457*** 
(.1095) 
F-statistic in the First Stage 8.49  5.91  25.73  23.36 
Note: The other control variables are the same as in Table 3 and individuals are not older than 50 years old. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 6: Alternative Measures of Marriage Harmony 
 Dependent Variable = Have Conflicts or not 
 Husband Wife 
 Probit IV Probit IV 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.089** 
(.038) 
-1.251*** 
(.248) 
-.072** 
(.036) 
-.888*** 
(.165) 
Urban 
-.080 
(.070) 
-.436*** 
(.098) 
.190*** 
(.059) 
-.029 
(.062) 
Observations 7183 7177 8158 8157 
Pseudo R2 .026 - .037 . 
 Husband 
 Rural Urban 
 Probit IV Probit IV 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.111** 
(.049) 
-1.093*** 
(.236) 
-.033 
(.062) 
-.683 
(.844) 
Observations 3398 3398 3785 3778 
Pseudo R2 .056 - .016 - 
 Wife 
 Rural Urban 
 Probit IV Probit IV 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.033 
(.062) 
-.439* 
(.261) 
-.086 
(.061) 
-2.342*** 
(.476) 
Observations 3785 4237 3906 3905 
Pseudo R2 .016 - .027 . 
 
Ordered Probit: No conflict, mutual compromise, 
unilateral compromise/third-party intervention    
 All Areas All Areas 
 Husband Wife Husband Wife 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.099*** 
(.032) 
-.051*  
(.029) 
-.110*** 
(.039) 
-.043 
(.035) 
Parental 
Involvement* 
Urban 
  
.028  
(.065) 
-.022 
(.061) 
Observations 6887 7742 6887 7742 
Pseudo R2 .012 .017 .012 .017 
Note: The other control variables are the same as in Table 3. The standard 
errors in probit IV are obtained by bootstrapping. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Table 7: Parental Involvement and Spouse Selection Criteria 
Note: The unit of observation is individual respondent. The other control variables include cohort dummies, mother 
and father’s years of schooling, political party membership variables (whether the individual is a communist party 
member, communist youth league, or a democratic party member), religion (Muslim, Christian or catholic, 
Buddhist), ethnic (Han, Huei, Korean, Manchurian), whether the province is rich (with above-average income) and 
has higher-than-average parental education levels.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Spouse Selection Criteria by Matchmaking Method 
 Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 Character Temperament 
Family  
Background 
Good  
Look 
Education Occupation 
Political 
Membership 
All .75 (.43) .41 (.49) .14 (.34) .23 (.42) .11 (.31) .09 (.28) .05 (.21) 
Parental 
Involvement 
.71 (.46) .38 (.48) .19 (.39) .27 (.44) .07 (.26) .07 (.25) .04 (.18) 
Self Search .79 (.41) .43 (.50) .10 (.30) .20 (.40) .13 (.33) .10 (.30) .06 (.23) 
Difference -.082*** 
(.007) 
-.006*** 
(.008) 
.084*** 
(.006) 
069*** 
(.007) 
-.054*** 
(.005) 
-.028*** 
(.004) 
-.022*** 
(.003) 
 Regression Results: Probit 
 Character Temperament Family 
Background 
Good 
Look 
Education Occupation Political 
Membership 
Parental 
Involvement 
-.133*** 
(.023) 
-.133*** 
(.023) 
.133*** 
(.028) 
.021 
(.024) 
.040 
(.033) 
-.020 
(.033) 
-.065 
(.041) 
Urban 
.203*** 
(.031) 
.047* 
(.022) 
-.552*** 
(.039) 
-.552*** 
(.032) 
.274*** 
(.039) 
.410*** 
(.042) 
.255*** 
(.053) 
Years of 
Schooling 
.002 
(.004) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
-.019*** 
(.003) 
.002 
(.004) 
.083*** 
(.005) 
.012** 
(.005) 
.016** 
(.006) 
Male 
.052** 
(.023) 
.158*** 
(.021) 
-.413*** 
(.028) 
.325*** 
(.023) 
-.324*** 
(.030) 
-.256*** 
(.030) 
-.275*** 
(.056) 
Observations 17119 17119 17119 17117 17119 17119 17119 
Pseudo R2 .020 .011 .096 .053 .123 .036 .106 
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Variables 
Mean (Std 
Deviation) 
Number of 
Observations 
Marriage Outcomes   
Marital Harmony 1.00 (.72) 16247 
Log (joint couple income) 8.81 (1.23) 17119 
Searching Method   
Parental involvement .40 (.49) 17119 
Individual Characteristics   
Age 36.25 (8.09) 17119 
Years of schooling 7.96 (3.89) 17119 
Good health .67 (.47) 17119 
Younger cohort (age<=35) .48 (.50) 17119 
Political Membership   
communist party member .16 (.37) 17119 
communist youth league .07 (.25) 17119 
democratic party member .004 (.06) 17119 
Religion   
Muslim .06 (.24) 17119 
Christian or catholic .01 (.09) 17119 
Buddhist .04 (.19) 17119 
Ethnic   
Huei .06 (.24) 17119 
Korean .003 (.05) 17119 
Manchurian .01 (.10) 17119 
Other minority .003 (.06) 17119 
Type of First Job   
First job in state-owned sector .28 (.45) 15341 
First job in collectively-owned firms .25 (.43) 15341 
First job in individually-owned firms .06 (.24) 15341 
First job in joint venture or foreign firms .01 (.12) 15341 
First job is of other types .03 (.17) 15341 
First job in state-owned sector with no change of jobs .36 (.48) 15341 
Parents Characteristics   
Mother Schooling   
Father Schooling   
Location Characteristics   
Urban .45 (.50) 17119 
With higher-than-average parental education .48 (.50) 17119 
Rich Province with higher-than-average incomes .61 (.49) 17119 
Couple Information   
Log (Time after marriage) 2.37 (.74) 17119 
Living together with parents after marriage .54 (.50) 17119 
Same ethnic .98 (.15) 17119 
Same religion .95 (.22) 17119 
Same political membership .17 (.38) 17119 
Difference in ages 2.39 (2.23) 17119 
Difference in years of schooling 1.05 (.74) 17119 
